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The current IEEE 802.11 medium access control standard is being deployed
in coffee shops, airports and even across major cities. The terminals accessing these
wi-fi access points do not belong to the same entity, as in corporate networks, but are
usually individually owned and operated. Entities sharing these network resources
have no incentive in following protocol rules other than to optimize their overall
utility, usually a function of throughput and delay. In this thesis, we discuss the
shortfalls of the current IEEE 802.11 standard in environments where terminals are
competing for a common bandwidth resource and we introduce a new MAC protocol
designed with the above considerations. Thus the new Incentive Compatible MAC
(ICMAC) protocol uses Vickrey auction to allocate time slots and is better suited for
these open environments, without compromising the overall network performance.
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Most network protocols today are designed with the objective of maximizing
performance of the network with respect to a set of network criteria, typically a
function of throughput and delay, with the assumption that all participating entities
of the network will follow protocol rules. This assumption has not been a major
issue in wired networks due to the reliable medium and the abundance of bandwidth.
However, this is not the case in wireless networks due to the broadcast nature of
the wireless medium and the stringent bandwidth limitation. It has been shown
that the de-facto medium access control for wireless networks, in particular the
IEEE 802.11 protocol [1], suffers from many security weaknesses. A significant
amount of work has been done to improve this MAC protocol. Security issues were
of various types: Some involved the mechanism of association and authentication;
others were at the message encryption protocol [2]. However, the focus of this paper
is on the inherent access control mechanism. Different access techniques have been
used in multiuser communication allowing communicating entities to share common
bandwidth. Time division multiple access divides the time axis into time slots
and assigns individual slots to various users in a round robin fashion. Similarly,
frequency division multiple access divides the frequency domain into channels used
by various terminals. Both these fixed allocation access schemes are not appropriate
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for data traffic as traffic is of bursty nature and results in wasted resources when
users are assigned slots but have no traffic to send. Code division multiple access and
frequency division multiple access take advantage of both frequency and time domain
by means of spreading codes allowing concurrent transmissions. The multi-user
communication techniques described above are broadly used in cellular networks,
where the network is designed to sustain a given number of users at any given time.
Usually these networks are overdesigned and augmented with user demands and
new applications. Complexity is mainly at the base station; though, this trend is
starting to change as end terminals become more powerful. Cellular networks were
initially designed for voice traffic only and to sustain constant bit rate. However new
data services are starting to emerge in cell phones, relying on dynamic allocation
of resources. Another widely used multiuser access mechanism for wireless data
networks is random multiple access. As the name indicates, users access the channel
at random. The simplest form of random access is ALOHA, where a node access
the channel if it has a data packet to transmit and waits a random number of slots
if it experiences a collision. Progressively, more techniques and improvements have
been added to prevent collision at the access channel. MACA, MACAW and IEEE
802.11 are examples of protocols incorporating some of these collision avoidance
techniques. Physical carrier sensing, virtual carrier sensing and exponential backoff
timer are all used in IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function (DCF) in order
to reduce collision rate and to get a better network throughput [1]. Due to the
random nature of channel access, stations have an incentive to deviate from protocol
rules by altering transmission and backoff probabilities to gain better performance.
2
Noncooperative behavior in a random access MAC has been previously addressed.
In the next section we address some of these studies.
1.1 Related Work
In [3], the authors studied the stability region of a slotted ALOHA system with
selfish users for a general multipacket reception model. In the model considered, the
users enter the game according to a random process. User arrivals at every slot are
independent and identically distributed with expected number of arrivals per slot
λ. The users participating in the game have perfect information on the number of
competing stations and they all choose a symmetric transmission probability σ(n).
A user gets a payoff of 1 for a successful transmission and the transmission cost
is taken to be c. All users have the same per-slot discount rate of δ. Using Nash















rk is the expected number of successes when k stations transmit. For conventional
collision channel it reduces to λ < −cln(c). For a q-frequency hopping model to
λ < −cqln(c).
In [4, 5], the authors consider a slotted ALOHA network. Each user i ∈
{1, .., N} has a utility function Ui,a user mean arrival rate γi, a peak instantaneous
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arrival rate πi and a user willingness to pay per packet for the initial γi bandwidth
mi. The throughput unit is packets/slot. The utility is a function of throughput θi

























, if πi < γi
In this model, the network charges the station M$ for each successfully transmitted
packet. At every iteration and when the network reaches equilibrium, the price per
packet is updated in order to drive the throughput to T (M) according to
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θ
(Ui (θ)−Mθ)
the solution of user i payoff maximization. In the game proposed, at every iteration,
each user updates its transmission probability according to






























j. At every iteration, each user i also
advertises its transmission probability qi.
By using a Lyapunov function, the authors prove that under certain condition
the transmission probability vector q
¯
converges to a Nash equilibrium given by a
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solution of












= 0, for all i
with yi = (U
′
i)
−1(M). The convergence of the price strategy has also been considered
using another Lyapunov function; however, only users with yi > 0 were taken into
account. When all users are considered, we do not expect the solution to be stable
as some users will be switching on and off when M∗ is near mi. The model also
assumes that all stations are always backlogged and that is known by all stations.
In [6], a cooperative team problem and a noncooperative game were considered
for an ALOHA network with finite stations and packet arrival rate of qa. The authors
use Markov chain models and numeric results to solve for the optimum retransmis-
sion probabilities for networks with 2, 3 and 4 stations. For the cases considered,
with homogenous users, the retransmission probability solution decreases as func-
tion of qa for the team problem leading to an increase in throughput. However, the
Nash equilibrium solution for the game lead to an initial increase of throughput but
then to a dramatic drop as the arrival rate approached 1. They also studied the
effect of the transmission cost associated to the battery power. An additional cost
associated to each transmission may bring the game equilibrium throughput to the
cooperative team throughput. Note that the additional cost is due to transmission
and not delivered packets as in [4, 5]. The transmission cost is usually fixed as it is
associated to processing and battery power and the network or AP is not capable of
charging by transmission given that it cannot identify the senders during a collision.
The work discussed above focuses on equilibria of ALOHA networks using
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different models. In chapter 2, we address the vulnerability of the current IEEE
802.11 standard and the gain from noncooperation. In chapter 3, we use game theory
to explain the emergent behavior of rational entities in a random access channel and
its effect on throughput. The findings naturally lead to an auction mechanism to
alleviate some of the problems associated with random access. In chapters 4 and
5, we introduce a new Incentive Compatible Medium Access Control scheme and
discuss performance and design parameters. Finally, we present simulation results
pertaining to design and performance.
6
Chapter 2
The Distributed Coordination Function of IEEE 802.11
The IEEE 802.11 standard [1] has two functions, the Point Coordination Func-
tion (PCF) and the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). The PCF is an
optional function of the standard and is not even implemented in many wireless
routers. It is a contention free access mode where the AP regulates the access to
the channel according to its polling list in a round robin fashion. The polling list
is updated when a station gets associated with the AP and requests to be polled.
PCF results in wasted bandwidth when polled stations have no traffic to send. The
DCF is contention based access mode and uses CSMA/CA (Carrier Sense Multiple
Access with Collision Avoidance). DCF is more appropriate in data networks with
bursty traffic than its PCF counterpart. Thus, in the remaining of the thesis we
focus on the distributed coordination function of IEEE 802.11.
The DCF has two access modes, the RTS/CTS mode and the basic mode. In
the RTC/CTS mode, a node with a packet to transmit waits a random number of
time slots before it tries to reserve the wireless medium. The medium reservation
is done by the exchange of a Request to Send (RTS) and Clear to Send (CTS)
messages. With this exchange of messages, the other nodes are notified that the
medium will be busy for a duration advertised in the RTS packet and then updated
in the CTS packets. Thus terminals in the vicinity of the transmitter as well as those
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in the vicinity of the receiver are aware of the transmission (assuming these messages
are detected correctly) and update their Network Allocation Vector (NAV). NAV
informs a node about an ongoing transmission without continuously sensing the
medium. This is referred to as virtual transmission sensing as opposed to physical
transmission sensing. For instance, the duration advertised in RTS consists of the
time required to transmit the data frame, plus the CTS frame, plus the ACK frame,
plus three SIFS intervals. The SIFS interval is the short interframe interval required
between the RTS, DATA, CTS, and ACK frame. In the basic mode, a node starts
transmitting its data traffic after a random waiting time without the exchange of
the RTS and CTS control packets.
2.1 Exponential Backoff Mechanism
During a transmission, a collision can occur for various reasons. It can happen
if two nodes attempt to transmit at the same time, or if a node in the vicinity does
not detect neither RTS nor CTS packet belonging to the upcoming data transmission
and attempts to transmit while another data transmission is ongoing. Also, a loss
of an RTS or CTS packet is considered as a collision by the initiating transmitter.
The collision detection is unlike that of wired medium access, as nodes are not
capable of transmitting and receiving at the same time. In addition to the physical
and virtual carrier sensing, an exponential backoff mechanism is in place to reduce
collision rate. Before transmitting, each node picks a random waiting time from a
uniform distribution between 0 and CW − 1. The contention window, CW , follows
8






2iCWmin, if i < m
2mCWmin = CWmax, if i ≥ m.
(2.1)
CWmin is the starting window size and i is the number of collisions experienced by
the packet. Upon successful transmission, the window size CW gets reset to CWmin.
The random backoff selected corresponds to the number of slots a station needs to
wait in addition to the mandatory interframe interval, DIFS, before attempting to
transmit. The backoff timer is decremented only when the medium is idle; when
the medium becomes busy the backoff timer freezes and resumes once the current
transmission finishes. Fig. 2.1 illustrates this mechanism. In this example C freezes
its backoff counter as stations A and D transmit to B.



















Figure 2.1: IEEE 802.11 Backoff Operation
2.2 Shortfalls of the Random Backoff Time
The protocol was designed for networks where all the entities participating
obey the protocol rules. This assumption is valid if the network is owned by the
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same entity, i.e., company networks and rescue and relief mission networks. However
this will not apply in a network where nodes are individually owned and controlled,
and are competing for the same network resources. There are many existing net-
works of this form and more are being deployed. These networks are being deployed
in major cities, coffee shops, airports, etc. Some are provided free of charge or as
complementary service, with an espresso for instance; others charge users according
to time of use, in some airports for example, whether or not traffic is sent. Be-
fore we proceed any further, we classify users into three categories from a security
standpoint.
1. Well behaved user: A user/station obeying the exact rules of the protocol.
2. Selfish user: A user that might not follow exact protocol rules in order to gain
more bandwidth, shorter delay, and a better overall performance.
3. Malicious user: A user that has an objective of disrupting the network opera-
tion.
A selfish user might choose a short backoff time after a collision instead of choosing
a random backoff time from the uniform distribution as dictated by the protocol.
The easiness of protocol parameter modification in some wireless card has been
previously addressed in [7, 8]. To show the effect of noncooperation, we simulated
a simple 20 second scenario of IEEE 802.11b using OPNET. The load on all the
nodes is the same. The packet inter-arrival rate of all nodes is exponential with
mean of 0.01sec and the packet size is exponentially distributed with mean 2048
bytes. The wireless network consists of 8 nodes transmitting to the same destination.
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Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum is chosen at the physical layer with CWmin = 32
and CWmax = 1024 according to the standard [1]. The non-cooperating node in
this case still chooses from a uniform distribution but with a fixed window size of
CWmin = CWmax = 24. A non-cooperating node might still want to randomize to
prevent being detected or to avoid constant collisions with another non-cooperating
node. We show the MAC delay experienced by one of the cooperating nodes and
that of the non-cooperating node in Figure 2.2(a). In Figure 2.2(b), we also show
the data dropped due to buffer overflow. Here we have considered a buffer of length
256Kbits. The non-cooperating node experienced an average data loss of 500Kb/s,
whereas one of the cooperating nodes has a data loss rate of about 1.3Mb/s. This is a
reflection of the difference in the node throughput at about 800kb/s, very significant
considering the goodput of this scenario is less than 4Mb/s. We have only shown
the results for one of the seven cooperating nodes as they all experience similar
throughput and delay.
Several papers have addressed detection of protocol noncompliance, specifically
with the backoff mechanism [8, 9, 10] and others have proposed some modifications
to the backoff mechanism in order to make the detection of non-cooperation easier
[10, 11]. DOMINO [8] periodically collects backoff data during a monitoring period,
after which it compares the backoff of a node to the nominal of the network with some
tolerance parameter. It also keeps a cheating counter for every node. The counter is
incremented if a potential non compliance is detected and decremented if the data
collected from a node passes the threshold test. If the counter reaches a threshold
of K, the node in question is considered cheating. This detection scheme is not
11



















































Figure 2.2: Cooperation vs Noncooperation in IEEE 802.11
robust against more adaptive cheating mechanisms, as mentioned by the authors.
For example, by knowing the duration of the collection period, a non compliant node
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can follow the backoff mechanism of IEEE 802.11 for 3 periods so that its counter
gets decremented at least twice, and then can follow a very short backoff during
the next monitoring period, which may cause at most an increment of 2 in the
cheating counter. Thus, the selfish node keeps the counter within bound and avoids
being detected. Another weakness of DOMINO is that no backoff measurements
are collected after sensing a collision, thus allowing a selfish user to go undetected
when transmitting with short backoff after a channel collision. It is hard to detect
non-cooperation of nodes since the backoff times are of random nature and a lot
of statistics need to be detected before any assertion can be made. In general, a
selfish node can adapt its backoff time to the detection mechanism; thus, a detection
mechanism will only limit the extent of non-cooperation. In [10], the authors propose
a modification to IEEE 802.11 to ensure the randomness of the backoff values. The
protocol takes advantage of a hash function and its binding and hiding property
to achieve an agreement on a random backoff between two non-trusted parties.
The approach proposed in [11] to alleviate problems relating to the randomness
of station backoffs is to assign the receiver the task of choosing backoff values for
the senders. The receiver then checks the actual backoff against the assigned one.
The authors have only addressed the case of backlogged stations and in reality, it
would be cumbersome and difficult for the receiver to track the real backoff of all
stations. Stations see different channels and backoff timers freeze when the station




Bayesian Games and Protocol Design
In the game theory literature, what we have been calling selfish user is consid-
ered to be merely a rational user, one who wants to maximize his or her own utility,
as one would expect. In our case, for example, the utility of a user can be a function
of the throughput and delay.
Before we proceed further, we introduce few definitions, concepts and results
that we will need in the subsequent sections. When the payoffs of other players are
not well known in advance or depend on the player types, the game is considered
to have incomplete information. We thus resort to Bayesian games [12, 13]. A n
player Bayesian game can be described with
Γ = {S1, . . . , Sn, T1, . . . , Tn, p1, . . . , pn, U1, . . . , Un}
where Si is the set of strategies of player i. Ti is the set of types of player i.
pi = p(t−i|ti) is the player belief about other player types t−i given his or her own
type ti. Ui is the player utility and is a function of the player types and their
strategies.
Bayesian equilibrium is an extension of the Nash equilibrium in the case of








p(t−i|ti)Ui[σ−i(t), si, t],∀i, si ∈ Si (3.1)
σi is the plan of action for each possible type.
σi : Ti → Si
In other words, and along the Nash equilibrium concept, no player i wants to deviate
from σi(ti) given his or her belief pi(t−i|ti) and that the other players are following
the Bayesian equilibrium σ−i(t−i). We are now ready to revisit the random multiple
access problem. For simplicity, let’s assume that all users are of the same type, thus
the Bayesian equilibrium (3.1) becomes
Ui[σ(t), t] ≥ Ui[σ−i(t), si, t], ∀i, si ∈ Si
3.1 Random Access Nash Equilibrium
We present the normal form game for three station game along the simple 2
station model presented in [14] and generalize the results to n station game. This
will give insight into some of the findings in [3, 4, 5, 15] relying on different models.
The station strategies are either Transmit or Wait, Si = {T, W}. A successful
transmission yields a payoff of us, a failed transmission due to collision yields a
payoff of uf and no transmission yields ui. The payoffs are general but must satisfy
uf < ui < us for obvious reasons. Fig. 3.1 shows the payoffs of the three stations
under all strategies sets. We are mainly interested in symmetric equilibria due
to fairness requirements. Let x, y and z denote the probability of transmission
15
T W
T uf , uf , uf uf , ui, uf
W ui, uf , uf ui, ui, us
T
T W
T uf , uf , ui us, ui, ui
W ui, us, ui ui, ui, ui
W
Figure 3.1: 3 Stations Normal Form Game
for station 1, 2 and 3 respectively. In order for station 1 to be willing to mix
between transmitting and waiting, it must be indifferent to the payoff it gets from
transmitting or from waiting; otherwise it will always choose the one with higher
payoff. In other words
U1|T = U1|W (3.2)
Ui|X is the expected utility of station i given it has followed strategy X. Equivalently,
yzuf + (1− y)zuf + y(1− z)uf + (1− y)(1− z)us = ui
We get symmetric equations when considering the other users. The solution of these
sets of non-linear equations yields all the mixed Nash equilibrium. With x = y = z,
we get from (3.2)















xk(1− x)n−1−kuf = ui
(1− x)n−1us +
(
1− (1− x)n−1) uf = ui






Note that ui−uf = c is the cost of transmission and us−uf = v is the payoff due to
successful transmission. v can be associated to the valuation of the medium or the
transmitted packet. When transmission cost is negligible with respect to medium
valuation, the probability of transmission is close to 1. This Nash Equilibrium will
bring the network to a crawl, another instance of the tragedy of the common. On
the other hand, and as noted in [16], the backoff mechanism of IEEE 802.11 can be
viewed as a constant transmission probability in saturated state. This probability is
a function of the number of stations and the contention window limits CWmin and
CWmax, and thus the protocol is not in equilibrium for a rational user to follow it.
One way to regulate network performance is to add additional cost for transmission.
However, the receiver cannot detect who transmits during a collision; therefore, we
need to resort to a collision free scheme such as TDMA or FDMA to track and charge
for transmissions. We will revisit the transmission costs and the success valuations
in chapter 4.
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3.2 The Revelation Principle
An important result relating to the Bayesian equilibrium that we will be using
for resource allocation is the revelation principle.
Assume that σ∗(t) is a Bayesian equilibrium of
Γ = {S1, . . . , Sn, T1, . . . , Tn, p1, . . . , pn, U1, . . . , Un}.
Then there exists a game
Γ′ = {S ′1, . . . , S ′n, T1, . . . , Tn, p1, . . . , pn, U ′1, . . . , U ′n}
such that in this game, truthful reporting of type is a Bayesian equilibrium. Now, the
strategy set S ′i = Ti and the utility function is U
′
i(s
′, t) = Ui (σ∗ (s′) , t) [12, 13, 17].
A mechanism with the strategy set equal the type set is called a direct-
revelation mechanism. The user type Ti in our problem corresponds to the user
valuation of the time slot and the strategy set Si could be a probability of medium
access. The utility Ui is a function of node’s strategies, cost of transmission attempt
and payoff. What the revelation principle allows us to do is, instead of solving for
the difficult Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ satisfying the set of equations (3.1), we
can come up with an intuitive mechanism by setting the proper utility function so
as to make users report their true need for the medium.
A direct-revelation mechanism where truthful reporting is the best strategy is
called Incentive Compatible. Thus, one of our objectives is to design a medium access
protocol that is (i) incentive compatible. In developing an intuitive mechanism with
a suitable utility function, we resort to auction theory as it has been extensively
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studied in the allocation of goods [17]. An important difference in our problem is
that we are mainly after network performance and not seller (Access Point) utility
maximization. The other requirement we have is (ii) allocation efficiency, that is,
assigning the time slots to those terminals valuing it the most. This constraint also
provides quality of service in protocol design.
3.3 Truth Telling Second Price Auction
A clever and simple allocation mechanism where each player/bidder wants to
reveal his true valuation is the second-price auction. In the second-price auction,
the seller has only one item for sale, and the highest bidder gets the item and only
pays the second highest bid of the auction and not his own. Thus winner payment
is independent on his bidding price. The bidding price only determines the winner.





vi −maxj 6=ibj, if bi > maxj 6=i bj
0, if bi ≤ maxj 6=i bj
bj is player j bid for j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. With this mechanism, every bidder wants to
bid his true value.
Proof. Let xi be user i bid and let pi = maxj 6=i bj. User i wants to maximize his
utility Ui. Let’s now consider the case xi > vi, then we get
Ui =P (pi > xi > vi)0 + P (xi > pi > vi)(vi − pi) + P (xi > vi > pi)(vi − pi)
≤P (x∗i = vi > pi)(vi − pi)
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By bidding x∗i = vi we eliminate the second term which yields a negative payoff
without affecting the rest of the terms. A similar argument holds if user i were to
bid xi < vi
Biding a higher value than the true valuation results in a positive probability
that the bidder wins the item and the amount paid result in a negative total payoff.
Bidding a lower value than the true valuation results in a positive probability of not
winning the item when the bidder could have made profit had he bid his true value.
Second price auction is then incentive compatible.
3.4 Vickrey Auction and Time Slot Allocation
The Vickrey auction adopts the idea of second price auction but applies when
auctioning multiple items, say K. Each bidder submits his or her demand curve and
the seller then calculates the aggregate demand on the goods to be allocated and the
K highest winning bids are assigned the items. We use demand curve and bidding
vector interchangeably as they are reciprocal of each other. The winning bidders pay
only the opportunity cost. The opportunity cost for bidder i refers to the willingness
of losing bidders to pay for the items won by i. Formally, with K items to be
allocated, each bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n} submits a bidding vector bi = (b1i , b2i , . . . , bKi ),
where bki is his bid for a k
th item. Let c−i = (c1−i, . . . , c
K
−i) with element c
`
−i being
the `th largest value among bkj , ∀k ∈ {1, . . . K}, j 6= i. The opportunity cost and the





This amount is the total value of the ki highest losing bids, the opportunity cost.
Vickrey auction is also incentive compatible, that is, a node’s best strategy is to bid
its true valuation for the items. There are some practical problems with the Vickrey
auction in certain settings, but is very appropriate for our bandwidth allocation
problem. Some variants of the Vickrey auction are very successful in practice. For
example, Google AdWords uses it to auction advertisement slots next to search
results [18].
As an illustrative example, consider the demand curves depicted in table 3.1.
Entry (m,Stai) in the table is the willingness of station i to pay for the m
th won
item. In this example K = 3.
Slot Sta1 Sta2 Sta3
1 6 7 3
2 4 5 2
3 1 1 0
Table 3.1: Vickrey Auction Example
The winning stations are station 1 and station 2 as they have the three highest
bids. Station 1 gets one item and station 2 gets two items. The price paid by 1 is 3
and that paid by 2 is 7 = 4 + 3 . These paid prices reflect the opportunity cost.
Recall that our initial design criterion was to develop a medium access control
protocol that is robust in an environment where participating stations are individ-
ually owned and capable of altering protocol rules. Time slot allocation follows the
idea presented in the Vickrey auction and time slots are assigned to the terminals
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that value them the most. Terminals participating in this protocol have an incentive
to participate in the network and never deviate from reporting their true valuation
for the medium. The base station must therefore collect the node valuation before
assigning the time slots for transmission. Slot assignment is done in rounds. The
number of time slots allocated in every round and the length of each time slot are
design parameters and depend on the number of terminals associated with the AP,
type of data traffic and supported services. Design parameters will be addressed
later on. We can assume that at every round, K number of slots will be allocated
to the active users, those who are associated with the receiver.
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Chapter 4
Incentive Compatible Medium Access Control
The Incentive Compatible MAC (ICMAC) does not deal with the association
and authentication mechanism, but we assume that a secure mechanism is in place.
The receiver station has the task of scheduling the transmission of successfully as-





Station nStation 1 Station a Station b
Base Station
Figure 4.1: ICMAC Protocol
every round, the base station sends a Demand Request (DRQ) packet to inform
that it is taking bids for the K next time slots. Upon hearing a DRQ packet, every
node responds with a Demand Response (DRS) packet. A DRS packet contains the
station address and its bids for each of the K time slots. Attributed to every station
is an association ID (AID) and a demand response time slot allowing the stations
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to access the medium in a deterministic TDMA fashion with no collision during
the bid collection phase. After collecting all the demand curves, the base station
aggregates the station demands to determine the winning K bids. Then, sequential
Clear To Send (CTS) messages are sent from the AP to the stations, from highest
to lowest winning bids, informing them of the time of transmission and number of
allocated successive transmissions. Note that once the station is allocated the time
slot, it can send its data traffic to any node and not necessarily to the coordination
station. Along the CTS message, an optional acknowledgement is sent to the previ-
ous transmitting station on the sent data packets. In Fig. 4, station a is one of the
n stations associated with the base station having the highest bids for that round.
It receives a CTS packet informing it that it gets the next four time slots. After
transmitting data for four successive time slots, station a listens for the next CTS
packet to get an acknowledgment about its previously transmitted packets. A bit is
associated with every previously transmitted packet for acknowledgment. In order
to make the acknowledgment mechanism fruitful, the CTS message assigns no more
than MaxSch slots at a time. That is, if a station wins more than MaxSch, the
base station does not schedule all those transmissions in one shot, but breaks them
apart, so they get progressively acknowledged.
In addition, the AP needs to have a secure and flexible monetary system in
place along with the association in order to charge winning users for the opportunity
cost. For example, a station can set a limit on expenditure and get notified when it
has reached its limit, or it can check its balance.
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4.1 Control Packets
ICMAC control messaging will be exchanged between the transmitters and
the receiver to determine who will be transmitting and when. This control overhead
must be analyzed thoroughly. The frame formats have been mainly borrowed from
IEEE 802.11. The DRQ packet, the DRS packet and the CTS packet are all similar
to the CTS of IEEE 802.11. The number of slots per round and the fragment size
can be either advertised during association or through the DRQ packet. The DRS
packet has an additional field for the bidding vector.
4.2 Time Slot Valuation
A secure monetary or unit system has to be in place to carry out and enforce
some of the ideas presented here. Terminals have a private value for the medium
access, which is tightly dependent on delay and throughput. For example, the
valuation of the time slot depends on packets present in the queue of the transmitter
and/or running services such as VoIP. Packets are first categorized according to their
type, i.e., data, voice, and video. These packet types have different bandwidth and
delay requirements. Packet waiting time also impacts the valuation of the time slot.
Three example profiles of packet valuation are presented herein and shown in Fig.
4.2, every user is assumed to have independent valuation of packets. The time slot
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valuation is a function of the waiting time and user/packet type.
Y 1` (t) = c`





b`t + c`, if t ∈ [0, tmax` ]
0, otherwise
(4.1)






t is the waiting time of the packet in the queue, ` is the index of the packet type,
a`, b` and c` are type dependent parameters of the valuation function. Note that
tmax` is also type defined. Some real-time application might have hard constraints,
and packets could be dropped if not transmitted before some expiration time tmax` .
Another criterion that may also be considered is the ratio of packets in the queue















Figure 4.2: Valuation Function
with respect to the buffer size. When the queue size gets large, the new incoming
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packets might have to be dropped. In this case, the terminal station can attribute an
additional value to the time slot. Consider the following sigmoid valuation function
that depends on the queue length L, the buffer size QMAX , and the packet position







The parameters c` and b` will be functions of
L
QMAX
. They are both increasing
functions of L
QMAX
. The parameter c` determine the maximum increase in valuation
of the time slot. b` can be viewed as the limiting point of the affected packets. The
longer the queue the more packets we want to send leading to increase in valuation.
The function W`(p) decreases with the position of the packet in the queue. In Fig.
4.3, we show the additional valuation that is associated with the packet position for
various queue lengths L for QMAX=100. Therefore, the overall valuation of the time




























Figure 4.3: Queue Length Dependent Valuation
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slot is a function of the packet waiting time, the packet position and the length of
the queue. We are assuming that there are different queue types holding different
packet types.
V`(t, p) = Y`(t) + W`(p)
Fig. 4.4 shows the demand curves of two terminals using the information present at
their queues, or other information they might have about current running services.
This information can be simply represented in a vector. Quantization of the demand
curve would also be used to shorten transmission of demand curves and to simplify
computation and decision making at the receiver. The receiver can calculate the
aggregate demand and then allocate the time slots accordingly. In this case the
number of time slots being offered is 20. As before, the highest bids determine the
winner and the price paid is the opportunity cost.















Figure 4.4: Demand Curves
28
Chapter 5
ICMAC Performance and Design Parameters
5.1 Performance
Before we proceed any further, we define some parameters and tabulate packet
sizes and design parameters in Table 5.1. With little abuse of notation phyhdr is
shown in µs and in bits and kept the same for 1Mb/s and 11Mb/s transmission
rates. Design parameters need to be chosen by an administrator based on the
type of traffic and user needs. The designated parameters will impact the overall
throughput, the delay and the overhead. The control packets, DRQ, DRS, CTS
are all sent at control transmission rate of 1Mb/s. We calculate the throughput of
the protocol for what we consider reasonable parameters for some applications. We
assume data occupy the whole fragment in this initial calculation. We will revisit




In calculating the round duration we have to consider the transmission rate of the






















Inter frame duration SIFS = 10 µs
Physical layer delay phyhdr = 192 µs
MAC header machdr = 272 bits
Number of slots per round K (design parameter) slots
Fragment length FLength (design parameter) bits
Value representation in bits BidRep bits
DRQ packet length 160 + phyhdr bits
DRS packet length 160 + phyhdr + K ∗BidRep bits
Maximum packets scheduled MaxSch n/a
CTS packet length 160 + phyhdr + MaxSch bits
DATA packet length 272 + FLength bits
Table 5.1: Packet sizes and Parameters
In general, we show results for 1Mb/s and 11Mb/s data transmission rates
while keeping the control rate fixed at 1Mb/s. The control rate might be kept at a
lower transmission rate to give it greater protection and better success rate. After
the proper scaling, the results for 1Mb/s for both control and data transmission rate
can also be used as a good estimate - some headers are independent of rate - on the
performance of other systems that keep control and data rate the same. We now
show the round duration in Fig. 5.1 as a function of the number of nodes and the
number of slot per round for both 1Mb/s and 11Mb/s data rates while keeping the



























































(b) 11Mb/s Data Transmission
Figure 5.1: ICMAC Round Duration
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Using the round duration, we can get an estimate of the MAC delay, not
including any queueing delay. Recall that stations submit bids only when they have
traffic to send or some services running, such as VoIP. In the case where a station
only requests slots when it has packets to send, a new incoming packet of highest
type arriving after the DRQ transmission has to wait for the remaining time until
the next DRQ plus the new bid collection time. The elapsed time between the
station DRQs is the Round Duration(RD). If we consider, as an example, a poisson
arrival and the memoryless property of the exponential distribution, we can express
the probability density of arrival time given a packet arrives during a RD time as
f(t|t ≤ RD) = λ exp(−λt)
1− exp(−λRD) .
with expected arrival time




yielding an expected MAC delay of




− RD exp (−λRD)
1− exp (−λRD)
)
+ (N − AID)(SIFS + DRS)
(5.1)
N is the number of stations and AID is the association ID. Thus stations with
larger association ID experience a slightly better MAC delay; however this won’t be
an issue in a practical scenario with a reasonable size of stations.
In Fig. 5.2, we plot the throughput as a function of the number of nodes and
the number of slot per round for both 1Mb/s and 11Mb/s data rates while keeping
the control rate at 1Mb/s. The packet sizes are again assumed to be constant of
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length 1024 bytes. BidRep=8 bits are used for value representation. It is also
important to note that in the calculation, each packet is individually scheduled
and fully occupy the data fragment in the time slot. Multiple scheduling is more
appropriate when consecutive winning bids belong to the same station. The benefit
of this will be highlighted later.
The performance drops with the number of stations due to bid collection at
every round, especially if the control packet transmission rate is lower than the
of data transmission rate. In order to reduce the overhead incurred from this bid
collection, the network designer can increase the number of slots allocated at every
round. The other alternative is to auction multiple rounds at a time. The later
option is also appropriate in situations where the services running in the network
require sustainable throughput over multiple rounds. In Fig. 5.3 we show the
potential throughput gain from auctioning multiple rounds at a time for the case
n=20, K=50, fragment of 1024 bytes and data transmission rate of 11Mbps. The
drawback from auctioning many rounds at a time is that some slots may be wasted as
the winning stations may have no packets to transmit at later rounds. The extreme
case of allocating slots over multiple rounds becomes a fixed TDMA scheme which is
not appropriate in data networks. We also plotted the impact on the round duration.
As an initial comparison with the performance of IEEE 802.11, we rely on the



























































(b) 11Mb/s Data Transmission
Figure 5.2: ICMAC Throughput
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Figure 5.3: Throughput and Round Duration
5.1.1 IEEE 802.11 Markov Chain Model
The model assumes that all the nodes participating are in a saturation and
uses a two state Markov chain. The first state being the backoff stage and the
second state is the backoff counter. The backoff stage is i in equation (2.1) and
reflect the number of collisions already experienced by the packet. With p being the




P{i, k|i, k + 1} = 1 k ∈ (0,Wi − 2) i ∈ (0,m)
P{0, k|i, 0} = 1−p
W0
k ∈ (0,W0 − 1) i ∈ (0,m)
P{i, k|i− 1, 0} = p
Wi
k ∈ (0,Wi − 1) i ∈ (1,m)
P{m, k|m, 0} = p
Wm
k ∈ (0,Wm − 1)
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From the steady state distribution of the Markov chain, the probability of a node
transmitting during and idle slot is
τ =
2(1− 2p)
(1− 2p)(W + 1) + pW (1− (2p)m)
τ is obtained from the steady state probabilities of being at states with backoff
counter of 0. To solve for p and τ , another relations is used yielding a unique
solution for p and τ
p = 1− (1− τ)n−1
Next, we will focus on the throughput and not on the utilization; therefore, we need
to take into consideration the control and data transmission rates.
T =
PsPtrE[P ]
(1− Ptr)σ + PtrPsTs + Ptr(1− Ps)Tc (5.2)
Ts and Tc are the success duration and collision duration of a transmission respec-










+ SIFS + δ +
ACK
ctrlrate










+ DIFS + δ
Ptr is the probability that at least one node is transmitting and Ps is the probability
of success.




In the RTS/CTS mode, Ts and Tc become
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DIFS DCF interframe space
δ propagation delay
E[P ] expected payload
RTS request to send packet length
CTS clear to send packet length
ACK ack packet length
σ slot duration used for backoff counter























+ DIFS + δ
For more in depth discussion of the results above refer to [16]. Recall that the
throughput performance depends on a node transmission probability τ which itself
depends on CWmin and CWmax in addition to n. The physical layer used is the
Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum physical, with CWmin = 32 and CWmax = 1024.
Using the model discussed above we plot in Fig. 5.4 the throughput of both ICMAC
and IEEE 802.11. The message sizes are kept constant at 1024 bytes. With the
parameters above ICMAC performs better than both basic and RTS/CTS mode for
reasonable size of local neighbors. It does however degrade at a much faster rate
than RTS/CTS mode.
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Figure 5.4: ICMAC and IEEE 802.11 throughput
5.2 Design
As ICMAC is a TDMA based access control and the slot size is fixed, the
network designer has to properly choose the slot length and the number of slots
auctioned at each round. We consider a time slot to contain a CTS control message,
the data packet, their headers and all the interframe durations. Refer to Fig. 5.5
for better understanding. The overhead of a time slot is






h = 788µs and h = 584.4µs for a transmission data rate of 1Mb/s and 11Mb/s
respectively. We also denote by H the round overhead associated with bid collection.
It can be expressed as










Recall that DRS size depends on K, the number of slots allocated per round, and













































































Figure 5.5: ICMAC Overhead
5.2.1 Fragment Size
As messages might be sent over multiple slots and data might not fully occupy
the allocated fragment, we need to optimize the transmission efficiency with respect
to time slot duration. Clearly the optimum slot duration will be a function of
the message length and the overheads h and H. We assume that the data size is





























In (5.3), Y is the slot duration, d x
Y−he is the number of slots required by a message
of length x, H
K
represents the per unit overhead attributed to one slot due to the
round overhead H. with Z = Y + H
K
and h′ = H
K




































kP ((k − 1) (Z − h′) < X ≤ k (Z − h′)) (5.5)
P ((k − 1) (Z − h′) < X ≤ k (Z − h′)) is the probability that a message m requires
k time slots. As an example, we first look at an exponential distribution for packet
length, and then exponential packet size distribution mixed with a constant packet
size.
Exponential Distribution

















































































Equation (5.7) has a unique solution for Z > h′ that can be easily found numerically.
The solution Z∗ corresponds to a time duration which can be translated to data
fragment size of frag∗ = (Z∗ − h′) ∗DataRate.
In the case where all packets belonging to the same message are scheduled
with one CTS due to the same valuation, the transmission efficiency problem stays
the same, but now




The main drawback of ICMAC is the overhead that comes from bid collection
as it depends on the number of nodes and the value representation of the K values.
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However, one way to reduce it is to collect station bids for multiple rounds. The
winning station gets the same number of slots for multiple rounds. We can still use
the optimum fragment solution as before but now, the per slot overhead due to H,
H
K
, is divided further by the number of rounds auctioned R.
We plot in Fig. 5.6 the fragment size solution with respect to mean packet
size m̄ for fixed control transmission rate of 1Mb/s and data transmission rates of
11Mb/s and 1Mb/s for n=10 and K=50. We have included results on both indi-
vidual packet scheduling and multiple packet scheduling. The solution for optimum
packet size is smaller for multiple scheduling than individual scheduling since the
fragmentation penalty is less significant.




























Figure 5.6: Optimal Data Fragment Size
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Mixed Exponential and Constant Size Messages
We assume that traffic with exponentially distributed message size is sent with
probability p and traffic with constant message size is sent with probability 1−p. m̄

















































) + (1− p)
(
v̄
Z − h′ + 1
)

The minimum of the upper bound function in (5.9), is an upper bound on the min-
imum of the solution. Now using the lower bound in (5.9) we can limit the range of
the solution. We depict all three functions to show the process with which we find
a solution bound in Fig. 5.7. The figure shows the case of p=0.5, v̄=(160*8/11E6)s
and m̄=(1024*8/11E6)s. The solution in this case is 614µs for the slot duration
translating to 319bytes for the data fragment size. For p=0.75, we get 480bytes for
the data fragment size, as more messages are distributed according to the exponen-
tial distribution.
In addition to the message distribution, another important constraint that the
designer needs to keep in mind is that of the physical medium. The longer the
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Figure 5.7: Mixed Traffic Optimal Solution
fragment, the more susceptible it is to errors. Thus there are different limits to the
fragment length in different environments.
5.2.2 Number of Slots per Round
Recall that we expressed round duration as







The round duration time must be appropriate for the traffic supported on the net-
work. For example in delay sensitive application with constant bit rate, stations
rather have the slots spread through the round instead of getting all the trans-
missions in one shot. In the current protocol, the AP schedules only according to
the aggregate demand, thus limiting the round duration would allow interleaving
between station transmissions. The round duration also affects the MAC delay as
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f (x) dx (5.10)
s.t. Y ≥ h
K ∈ N
H + KY ≤ C













f (x) dx (5.11)



















As the number of slots K is an integer, we resort to numerical solution. From the
first constraint we have Z ≥ h and when combining with the third constraint we
get K ≤ ⌊C
h
⌋
. For a given K ≤ ⌊C
h
⌋
, the optimal solution Z∗K can be obtained
from (5.7) or Z∗K =
C
K
if (5.7) solution does not satisfy KZ ≤ C. We show the
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optimal pair for 10 stations with 11Mb/s data transmission rate and 1Mb/s control
transmission rate. The results are for a round duration constraint of 100ms. Again
the optimal slot size is translated to the fragment size as before.









We now present some simulation results in order to verify analytical solutions
obtained in previous chapters and to illustrate the self adjusting price to network
load and the inherent quality of service of ICMAC. We also present comparative
performance figures between ICMAC and the IEEE 802.11 DCF a for few simple
scenarios. We have used OPNET for simulation and each point corresponds to
multiple runs. The scenarios are all the same and that is n nodes sending to one
AP. The control transmission rate is kept at 1Mb/s throughout the simulations.
6.1 ICMAC Design
We have addressed design issues relating to optimal fragment size and number
of slots per round in chapter 5. We now show results for 10 nodes with 11Mb/s data
rate and exponentially distributed message for 4 different means of 512 bytes, 1024
bytes, 2048 bytes and 4096 bytes. Packets are individually scheduled, Maxsch=1.
We plot in Fig. 6.1 the throughput for different fragment sizes and the network
performance peeks are in agreement with the analytical optimum fragment size in
Table 6.1. Simulation results for optimal fragment size in the case of multiple packet
scheduling are also in agreement with the analytical solution and shown in Fig. 6.2.
The simulations results have a 90% confidence interval below 2%.
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message mean(bytes) 512 1024 2048 4096
optimum fragment
length (bytes)
individual 771 1174 1756 2591
mult. scheduling 593 888 1311 1914
Table 6.1: Optimal Fragment Size


























Figure 6.1: Individual Scheduling
6.2 Multiple Packet Scheduling
As previously mentioned, there is an advantage for scheduling multiple trans-
missions for the same station with only one CTS packet. This benefit is highlighted
in Fig. 6.3 again for n=10 and K=50 for exponentially distributed messages with
different message means. Recall that MaxSch is the maximum number of packet
that can be scheduled at a time. We show the throughput as MaxSch is increased
and disabled. The optimum fragment size changes with MaxSch as discussed in
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Figure 6.2: Multiple Scheduling
chapter 5. However in this experiment we kept the fragment size fixed correspond-
ing to the optimum for individual scheduling. The throughput gain from individual
packet scheduling to completely disabling Maxsch is between 15% to 25%. This
significant gain is due to the added overhead of scheduling each packet separately
and especially as the control rate is kept at 1Mb/s. The relative gain drops as
MaxSch is increased. In previous work [19], we have shown a lower gain when
MaxSch is disabled. This is due to the way bidding ties are handled. In the origi-
nal work, individual bid value are handled separately, but in the new scheme, bids
coming from the same user with same prices are grouped together. In other words,
when adding these bids to the aggregate bids, same value bids from the same user

































Figure 6.3: Multiple Scheduling
6.3 ICMAC vs IEEE 802.11
Finally, we show a throughput comparison between ICMAC and IEEE 802.11
in Fig. 6.4. We have simulated 5 runs of 30 seconds for each point yielding a 90%
confidence interval less than 1%. For IEEE 802.11, we used a simple collision model,
that is a transmission is lost only if two or more concurrent transmissions start at
the same time. We set the RTS/CTS threshold at 512 bytes, that is packet larger
than 512 bytes exchange control messages before data transmission. Packets larger
than 2304 bytes get fragmented. Data and control transmission rates are at 11Mb/s
and 1Mb/s respectively for both protocols. All nodes are in saturation mode and
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message sizes are again exponentially distributed with varying means as indicated in
the figure. Note that we are not favoring ICMAC here with exponential message size
since the fragments are of fixed size and some bandwidth is wasted when data does
not fully occupy the slot. We show the results for ICMAC with 1 round scheduling
and K=50. Both protocols perform better with larger message means. As one would
expect, the throughput of ICMAC drops with the number of nodes due to the initial
bid collection at the beginning of every round. IEEE 802.11 shows a similar trend
with respect to the number of nodes but at a slower rate. Note that we use a simple
physical model here and IEEE 802.11 does not suffer from hidden terminals as all
transmissions are simultaneously and correctly detected, but in a real scenario this
would induce degradations in performance.





























Figure 6.4: IEEE 802.11 and ICMAC Throughput
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6.4 Communication Cost
We now show how communication cost gets adjusted with traffic demand.
6.4.1 Same User Types
The network consists of 12 nodes communicating to an AP. In this scenario,
all nodes are of the same type and value the slot length and their data packets
the same. Their slot valuation is solely based on the packet waiting time. We have
used sigmoid function described by the third expression in (4.1) with the parameters
in table 6.2. The parameters range and offset are more intuitive. offset is the
function value at 0. range is the maximum value of the function minus the offset.






d = offset− c






Table 6.2: Valuation Function Parameters
All stations generate data packets according to a poisson process with mean
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interarrival time of 0.02s. Packet sizes are exponentially distributed with mean of
1024 bytes. 9 nodes are always generating traffic corresponding to a total load of
4.096Mb/s. The three remaining stations 10, 11 and 12 generate traffic only at 20s
and 60s for a duration of 20 seconds each time. When all 12 nodes are transmitting,
the network load becomes 4.915Mb/s.
In Fig. 6.5 we show the average slot price at every round for 3 different
simulation runs. The slot price starts increasing as a reflection of the buffers getting
filled as shown in Fig. 6.6. We have only shown the queue length of stations 1 and
10 of the first run. In this example, 50 slots are assigned at every round and the slot
length corresponds to a packet size of 900 bytes. When stations 10, 11 and 12 are



















Figure 6.5: Self Adjusting Price
inactive, the system is stable but becomes saturated when they become active. We
plot the network load and the average price response in Fig. 6.7 for the first run.
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Figure 6.6: Stations Queue Length
Recall that the round duration is a function of the number of stations asso-
ciated with the AP, the slot length, and the number slots allocated in a round.
The round duration for this scenario in the case of individual scheduling is 76.2 ms.
However, in the simulation we allow for multiple packet scheduling when consecutive
winning bids correspond to the same station and this results in a shorter duration
as some of the CTS message are eliminated. Note that the MAC delay profile in
Fig. 6.8 follows that of the price. Due to the valuation function in this example, the
AP services the station with the longest waiting time and the overall system can be
viewed as first come first serve.
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Figure 6.7: Average Price Response to Load
6.4.2 Different User Types and Qos
We now take a look at network with three different types of users with three
different valuation functions. Again the functions are taken to be sigmoid function
with parameters shown in Table 6.3. We have also plotted the three function in Fig.
6.9. The first valuation function can be associated with normal traffic and the other
two functions can be associated with higher priority data traffics.
In this scenario, the first 10 stations generate packets according to a poisson
process with mean packet interarrival time of 0.022s and the message size are expo-
nentially distributed with mean of 1024 bytes. Stations 11 and 12 start generating
traffic at time 25s and 50s respectively until 100s. Stations are divided into three


















Table 6.3: Valuation Function Parameters
56





















Figure 6.8: Medium Access Delay
data type and the rest of the stations generate the highest data types. When only
10 stations are transmitting, the network is still stable. When station 11 and 12
start generating data traffic, the network becomes overloaded. However, due to sta-
tion/user types and their respective valuation function, different type stations see
different performances. In Fig. 6.10, we show the media access delay of the three
different types. The delay experienced by the different stations is ranked according
to their types and data priorities. Normal priority stations start seeing an increased
delay as station 11 and 12 start generating traffic. High and highest priority sta-
tions experience little variation as stations 11 and 12 become active. Stations of
high priority experience an average MAC delay of 70ms and station of highest type
experience a delay of 50ms even when the network is overloaded. It is important
to note that low delay experienced by the stations even when their valuation and
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transmission request solely depends on data packet present in the queue. Transmis-
sion request could depend on running services even in the absence of packets in the
queue during demand request collection phase.
Only normal priority stations experience buffer overflow. After the buffers
get full, normal type stations start dropping new incoming data traffic at a rate
of 75kb/s. The transmission price gets adjusted and reflects only the opportunity
cost. Initially slot prices are very low, but they get a slight jump at 25 s with
the arrival of station 11 and further increase after 50 s when the network becomes
overloaded. The average price of the slot becomes 63 corresponding to the price of
normal type stations and their willingness to pay for the slots when experiencing
long waiting times. The price unit must be set by the administrator. The price
needs to provide enough differentiation between the types and take into account the
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Figure 6.10: Medium Access Delay




We have introduced a new Incentive Compatible Medium Access Control that
takes into account the independence of the entities participating in a wireless net-
work. The stations share a common bandwidth resource and have a utility maxi-
mization objective. As previously noted by others and in the simple normal form
game discussed previously, the emergent Nash equilibrium yields a low throughput
due to the low cost to payoff ratio of transmission. The initial objective of this work
has been to design a new MAC protocol where participating stations have an incen-
tive to follow protocol rules and the Nash equilibrium reflects true user types and
access valuation even in environment of incomplete information. We have resorted
to auction theory to allocate bandwidth in a non-cooperative environment. The
new Incentive Compatible MAC is based on the Vickrey auction. At every round,
bids are collected for K time slots from the various stations, and then transmission
time slots are assigned to the various stations according to the highest bids. The
price paid by the winning stations reflect the opportunity cost. The benefit of using
Vickrey auction is two fold. First, it keeps the best bidding strategy simple even
in a incomplete information setting, as nodes only know their type and not that
of the other competing terminals. The other important feature of Vickrey auction
relates to setting up the appropriate transmission cost, the transmission cost is self
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adjusting and set by the competing users according to the network load and demand
curves. The low transmission cost was the network deteriorating factor in random
access. No administrator is required to adjust the usage price according to the load.
The wireless network usage becomes free under light traffic load and those who do
not wish to pay for bandwidth can still use it then. Through the time slot length,
number of slot per round, and rounds per bid collection, the network designer has
great flexibility to tailor medium access according to traffic demand. In addition
to being robust to greedy behavior, ICMAC shows no degradation in performance
with respect to IEEE 802.11 for realistic neighborhood size. ICMAC shows great
potential as we have not fully explored other potential improvements. We have
tried to keep many parameters similar to IEEE 802.11 for comparative reasons. For
instance, note that after bid collection, there is no need to individually send a CTS,
the AP can broadcast all at once the slot allocation to all the associated nodes.
In this scenario, acknowledgment would be left to higher layers as CTS no longer
transmit acknowledgment bits for the previously transmitted packets.
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